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On Measurement Scales: Neither Ordinal nor Interval? 
1. Introduction. 
There is a received view on measurement scales. It includes both a classification of scales and a 
set of prescriptions regarding which measurement inferences are justified. According to this 
view, the measurement scales used by researchers may be classified as nominal, ordinal, interval, 
or ratio, depending on the information they provide. Nominal scales only represent equality 
among elements of the same category (as in the classification: 1=alive, 2=dead). Ordinal scales 
represent rank-order among elements (e.g., in an attitudinal question, options 5=strongly agree, 
4=agree, 3=neutral, 2=disagree, 1=strongly disagree). Quantitative measurement, however, 
begins only with interval scales. Here the intervals (that is, the differences between subsequent 
levels of the scale) are equal in magnitude. For instance, the difference in temperature between 
2ºC and 3ºC is the same as the difference between 4ºC and 5ºC. This equality marks the 
difference between interval and ordinal scales—unlike the case of temperature in the Celsius 
scale, we do not know if the distance between ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ is the same as that 
between ‘agree’ and ‘neutral’. Finally, ratio scales, such as length measured in centimeters, are 
distinguishable from interval scales in that they have a non-arbitrary zero. 
This classification of scales is tied to a set of methodological prescriptions concerning the kinds 
of mathematical operations that may be applied to measurement results. These prescriptions are 
meant to ensure the correctness of inferences from measurements. For example, one prescription 
says researchers should not take averages of their results if they are measuring temperature with 
an ordinal scale (a “thermoscope”). This prescription entails researchers should not compare the 
average temperature of a group of places with that of another group in order to infer which one is 
on average hotter. Similarly, if measuring temperature with an interval scale, researchers should 
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not compute ratios in order to infer that, say, place a is twice as hot as place b. These scale types 
and the associated prescriptions were first articulated by Stanley Stevens in his famous 
“permissible statistics” (1946). Later, the Representational Theory of Measurement (RTM) (e.g., 
Suppes and Zinnes 1963) provided formal foundations for both the standard classification of 
scales and the (un)justified mathematical operations. But the endorsement of the classification 
and prescriptions in research methodology goes well beyond the adherence to RTM, or for that 
matter to any specific theory of measurement. It is just the received view on measurement scales, 
usually presented as standard methodology in textbooks across the sciences. 
A cursory look at many areas of the social and biomedical sciences, however, reveals that the 
prohibition on taking averages from ordinal scales has proved especially difficult to adhere to. 
Averages from ordinal scales are routinely used in psychology, sociology, economics, and 
medicine, despite methodologists frequently denouncing the practice as “impermissible.” While 
we have seen a revival of the philosophy of measurement in the last years (Tal 2017), little has 
been said regarding the mismatch between practice and methodology that surrounds 
measurement scales. I address this lacuna here, casting doubt on the adequacy of the received 
view. Focusing on the ordinal/interval distinction, I argue that the received view is too blunt a 
tool to be a satisfactory guide to measurement.  
After describing the scale classification and associated prescriptions of the received view (2), I 
raise the worry that the prescriptions may be overly restrictive if the classification is not 
exhaustive enough (3). In order to assess the relevance of this worry, I offer an epistemic 
(Bayesian) characterization of the ordinal/interval distinction, i.e., in terms of researchers’ beliefs 
about intervals (4). This novel epistemic characterization reveals that the ordinal/interval 
distinction is too coarse-grained to appropriately represent all real-world measurement scales. 
This is the author’s accepted manuscript without copyediting, formatting, or final corrections.  
It will be published in its final form in an upcoming issue of PHOS,  
published by The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The Philosophy of Science Association. 
Include the DOI when citing or quoting: https://doi.org/10.1086/714873.  
Copyright 2021 The Philosophy of Science Association.
12 
 
Indeed, (forced) application of the received view might lead to overly cautious methodological 
prescriptions. We need a subtler epistemic framework of measurement scales (5). 
2. The Received View on Measurement Scales. 
The received view defines scales by the uniqueness of their numerical assignments, which is in 
turn defined by set of transformations that preserve the information the scales give. These 
transformations are called “permissible” or “admissible” (Suppes and Zinnes 1963). Ordinal 
scales are defined as those that are unique up to order, which means that any order-preserving 
(“increasing monotonic”) transformation is admissible. This expresses formally the intuitive 
idea—famously articulated in (Stevens 1946)—that these scales only provide information about 
the relative order of elements, but nothing more. Thus, any order-preserving transformation gives 
us the same information we already had.  
Beyond providing information about order, the specific characteristic of interval scales is that 
their intervals are of equal magnitude. Here, any positive linear transformation (i.e., a 
transformation from x to y that satisfies: y= a + bx, b>0) is admissible. Any such transformation 
may change the magnitude that the scale assigns to 0 (if a ≠ 0) and the absolute value of the 
intervals, but not the equality of the intervals. As well as having equal intervals, ratio scales have 
a natural 0. Thus, only positive similarity transformations are admissible (i.e., y= bx, b>0); 
otherwise, ratios would not be preserved. 
The methodological prescriptions are based on these admissible transformations. The general 
form of the prescriptions is the following: when inferring claims from measurement results, only 
the claims that remain true under all admissible transformations are validly inferred. The 
justification for this general prescription lies in the fact that the information each scale gives is 
determined by what is common across their admissible transformations—all admissible 
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transformations of a scale represent the phenomenon equally well. For example, somebody might 
(incorrectly) infer that place a is twice as hot as place b because the former is at 20ºC while the 
latter at 10ºC. However, in a Fahrenheit scale, a’s temperature is 68ºF, and b is 50ºF (not 
68ºF/2=34ºF). Inferences such as ‘here is twice as hot as there’ are not validly made with these 
(interval) scales since the measurement comparison is sensitive to the admissible transformation 
used. This is why standard methodology rules them out.1 
Let us see how this general prescription applies to ordinal scales. The paradigm example of an 
ordinal scale in the physical sciences is Mohs’ scale of hardness for minerals. This scale uses the 
following rule to order minerals: if mineral a is able to scratch mineral b, then a is harder than b. 
It also assigns numbers from 1 to 10 in increasing levels of hardness, and each level is associated 
with a specific mineral. Because in ordinal scales the differences in magnitude between levels 
are not invariant across admissible transformations, mathematical operations like addition give 
results that are not invariant to admissible transformations. So, we cannot infer that groups of 
objects A and B have the same average hardness from the fact that their hardness levels in Mohs’ 
scale are A={2,3,4} and B={3,3,3}. For if we apply the transformation y = 2x, the averages now 
differ. 
Note that the prescription allows inferences when they are invariant. Under which condition are 
inferences with averages from ordinal scales invariant? A mathematical concept helps stating this 
                                                 
1 RTM conceives of this as an issue of “meaningfulness”: if a claim is not invariant to admissible 
transformations, it is not (empirically) “meaningful” (Suppes and Zinnes 1963; Roberts 1985). That the 
issue at stake is better understood as one of valid inferences (versus of meaningfulness) is persuasively 
argued in (Michell 1990). 
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condition. Consider GA and GB to be the cumulative distributions of each group: GA(x) is the 
fraction of minerals in group A that are as hard or less hard than x (and similar for GB). A well-
known result in statistics and economics says: A’s computed average is higher than B’s 
computed average under any order-preserving transformation iff GA(x) ≤ GB(x) for all x and with 
a strict inequality over some values of x. The biconditional’s right-hand side is called first order 
stochastic dominance (FOSD).2 FOSD assures that no matter which order-preserving 
transformation is used, A’s computed average would always be bigger than that of B. Of course, 
FOSD is a very strong condition. But nothing weaker can assure that the average comparison 
remains invariant under all order-preserving transformations. 
The received view, then, offers a classification of scales in terms of admissible transformations, 
and a set of prescriptions about measurement inferences based on whether the measurement 
results are invariant across admissible transformations. 
3. A Potential Problem for the Received View. 
Why does the received view single out only the admissible transformations (and thus, the kinds 
of scales) that it does? If scales are defined by their admissible transformations, what stops us 
from having many other kinds of scales? Of course, many sets of admissible transformations can 
be considered between that of all order-preserving transformations and that of all linear positive 
transformations (Suppes and Zinnes 1963, 14) (see an example below). 
The sets of admissible transformations considered are nested (Figure 1a). Order-preserving 
transformations include all positive linear transformations, which in turn include all positive 
similarity transformations. Importantly, there is a relation between the admissible 
                                                 
2 FOSD is defined (and this result proved) in Hadar and Russell (1969). 
This is the author’s accepted manuscript without copyediting, formatting, or final corrections.  
It will be published in its final form in an upcoming issue of PHOS,  
published by The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The Philosophy of Science Association. 
Include the DOI when citing or quoting: https://doi.org/10.1086/714873.  
Copyright 2021 The Philosophy of Science Association.
12 
 
transformations and what is necessary for conclusions to be invariant: the larger the set of 
admissible transformations, the stronger the condition for conclusions to be invariant (and thus 
validly inferred). For this reason, the conditions that ensure that conclusions are invariant are 
stronger for ordinal scales than for interval scales (e.g., FOSD is not needed to make average 
comparisons when working with interval scales). Given that there is a positive relationship 
between the size of the set of admissible transformations and the strength of the conditions 
necessary for results to be invariant, having scales that are defined by smaller sets of admissible 
transformations allows us to make valid inferences with weaker conditions. The possibility of 
having such scales makes the issue of what scales are (and are not) part of the standard 
classification more pressing.  
 
 
  1a      1b 
Figure 1. Sets of admissible transformations. 
 
To illustrate, imagine there exists another kind of scale, the ‘ordinal*’, defined by the following 
set of admissible transformations: any positive concave transformation (i.e., y = f(x), f’ >0, f’’≤0). 
This set of transformations is a subset of the set of order-preserving transformations, and it 
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contains the set of positive linear transformations (Figure 1b). Thus, the conditions necessary for 
results to be invariant are weaker with ordinal* scales than with ordinal scales. 
If a researcher wants to compare the average hardness of two groups of minerals, it makes a 
difference whether she has an ordinal versus an ordinal* scale. In the case of the former, she 
needs FOSD to hold. In the case of the latter, only a substantially weaker condition is necessary, 
called “second order stochastic dominance” (SOSD, see proof in Hadar and Russell 1969). 
Group comparisons that do not satisfy FOSD may satisfy SOSD. Hence, if a researcher is 
working with a scale that is in fact ordinal*, but which is deemed to be ordinal just because 
ordinal* is not part of the conceived possibilities, that researcher might be wrongly forbidden to 
make some inferences. If this were the case, the scales framework endorsed by the received view 
would be a defective guide for research—its (forced) application would classify valid inferences 
as ‘invalid.’ Policing too strict a (methodological) morality is, surely, an unwelcome result. 
Whether the received view, which excludes any kind of scale between ordinal and interval, is a 
good guide for research depends among other things on whether the scales applied to actual 
measurement situations fall (for the most part, at least) neatly into those categories. If they do, 
researchers would not be working with a scale excluded in the received view, and thus nobody 
would be wrongly abiding to too strict a prescription. We should consider, then, whether the kind 
of scales singled out by the received view just are the ones researchers are likely to find 
themselves with in actual practice. If this is true, it would save the received view from the charge 
of being a defective guide. I will argue that this is unlikely.  
The RTM-inspired way to assess whether this is the case would be to prove representational and 
uniqueness theorems about scales that lie between the ordinal and the interval, and verify 
whether the axioms required for those representational theorems are satisfied by the observed 
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empirical systems (i.e., the phenomena) that the scales aim to measure. It has been persuasively 
argued, however, that it is not strictly speaking possible to verify whether the axioms are 
satisfied (because of cases not yet observed, some of which are not observable in practice) 
(Michell 1990, 31; Sherry 2011, 517ff). In this paper I offer a different route. Taking inspiration 
from the “epistemic turn” in the philosophy of measurement, I propose that we characterize the 
ordinal/interval distinction explicitly in terms of researchers’ beliefs. This provides a more 
flexible way of thinking about scales; one that is less focused on the complete numerical 
representability of attributes abstractly considered (as in RTM), and more in the inferences 
researchers can validly make with measurement results.3 
From an epistemic perspective, the ordinal/interval distinction reduces to beliefs about 
differences between intervals. An interval scale is a scale where the intervals are known to be of 
equal magnitude (and thus, inferences from averages are always valid). In the case of ordinal 
scales, things are not as straightforward. Ordinal is a scale that only informs about order. The 
‘order’ part is easy to understand: all the intervals are known to be positive (so that, e.g., a ‘5’ is 
strictly harder than a ‘4’). But what does the ‘only’ part entail for a researcher’s belief about 
intervals’ differences? It is not obvious. Clearly, it is not correct to say: ‘If the intervals are 
known to be of different magnitude, a scale is known to be ordinal.’ For example, if a researcher 
knows that all intervals are different, but also knows that no interval is three or more times larger 
than any other, then it is not the case that all order-preserving transformations are epistemically 
on a par. (Any order-preserving transformation that makes some intervals three or more times 
                                                 
3 Narens’ (1981) results cast doubt on whether there can be representational theorems for scales between 
ordinal and interval. My approach here offers a way of conceiving such scales that avoids the need for 
these representational theorems. 
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larger than other intervals should be ruled out.) Thus, the mere knowledge that intervals are not 
equal—which implies that the scale is not interval—is insufficient for saying that the scale is 
ordinal. It seems plausible to say that, the less equal the intervals of a scale are, the farther the 
scale is from being interval. But when are the intervals different enough for the scale to be 
ordinal? More generally, what beliefs about differences between intervals are constitutive of an 
ordinal scale? The tools of Bayesian epistemology can help model the ordinal/interval 
distinction. 
4. A Bayesian Take on the Ordinal/Interval Distinction. 
Under the received view, data from an interval scale reliably informs us about average 
differences, while data from an ordinal scale does not. In this line, one approach to model the 
ordinal/interval distinction is to take it as a case of “unreliable evidence” (see Howson and 
Franklin 1994). The idea here is that the computed average difference may be, depending on the 
kind of scale, more or less indicative of how the two groups actually compare to each other. 
Imagine a researcher interested in (dis)confirming hypothesis 𝐻 (‘group A is harder on average 
than group B’). Observing some positive evidence (E: A’s average > B’s average) may confirm 
hypothesis H more or less depending on how reliable the scale is (K) for inferring hypotheses 
like H.4 We know that if the intervals are all equal (K=1), the scale is fully reliable: E entails H 
and is entailed by H (the likelihood is Pr(E|H&K)=1). The less equal the intervals are, the less 
indicative E is of H. This is because the numbers that the scale assigns to the different minerals 
(and, which determine whether E is the case) are less indicative of the actual relative degrees of 
hardness. One way of putting this is using the noise versus information analogy: the more 
                                                 
4 Just like in Howson and Franklin (1994), K is assumed to be probabilistically independent of H.  
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heterogeneous the intervals are, the larger the proportion of noise to information-about-degrees-
of-hardness there is in the numbers that the scale uses. Arguably, there is a point in which 
intervals are believed to be wildly heterogeneous enough (K ≈ 0) so that H and E are taken to be 
(for all purposes) probabilistically independent. In this case, there is no confirmation 
(Pr(H|E&K) = Pr(H|K)).5 
If we model the interval scale by a researcher that assumes (or assigns credence 1 to) K=1, how 
is an ordinal scale modelled? One option: the researcher assumes (or assigns credence 1 to) K ≈ 
0. Although at first sight plausible, there is something counterintuitive about this representation 
of an ordinal scale. It implies that the researcher takes for granted something quite specific about 
the intervals’ differences (namely, that they are wildly heterogeneous). This plainly contradicts 
the idea that an ordinal scale gives only information about order, so that nothing is known about 
intervals’ differences. Credence 1 in any other value of 𝐾 faces the same problem.  
Another possibility: the researcher assigns a uniform distribution to K: K~U(0,1). Motivated by 
the principle of insufficient reason, the idea could be that the researcher has no reason to take as 
more likely any specific degree of heterogeneity between intervals than other degrees. Treating 
them on a par, the idea would go, requires believing K~U(0,1). But, as it is well-known, the 
uniform distribution does not amount to an informationless assumption. For example, how is the 
                                                 
5 This discussion simplifies in some regards the relationship between intervals’ heterogeneity and the 
likelihood. It is true that, as suggested by the noise-to-information analogy, the more heterogeneous the 
intervals, the less one should trust average comparisons in general. However, heterogeneity can be 
increased in different ways, and not all of those ways affect all average comparisons equally. Once we fix 
the number of categories of the scale and the specific data observed, the specific intervals’ heterogeneity 
that matters can be stated precisely (see Larroulet Philippi n.d.). 
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fact that the researcher assigns equal probability to, say, K being between 0.5-0.6 and between 
0.6-0.7, compatible with her knowing nothing about intervals’ differences? 
So we have already a significant result. In this Bayesian framework, it is not clear how to 
represent an ordinal scale. No credence about K matches the informal description of an ordinal 
scale (namely, that which gives only information about order, so that nothing is known about 
intervals’ differences). For Bayesians, at least, this result should raise some concerns about the 
suitability of the notion of an ordinal scale. 
There is another possibility for (somehow still) representing ordinal scales in a standard 
Bayesian model. It involves giving up the goal of faithfully representing the researcher’s beliefs 
(or ignorance, rather) about intervals’ differences. We can black-box the beliefs (for a moment), 
and focus on representing faithfully the assumed corollary of having an ordinal scale. Ordinal 
scales, according to the received view, are such that positive evidence cannot be used to 
(dis)confirm H. So, taking that as a fixed point and reverse-engineering, we can now ask what 
should a researcher’s beliefs be like for this prescription to be brought about by our 
representation? The only belief compatible with such prescription is to assign credence 1 to K ≈ 
0 so that there is no confirmation.  
As argued above, these beliefs about the intervals do not match the common understanding of an 
ordinal scale. But unless we impose them on the part of the researcher, we just do not get the 
prescription that is supposed to hold for ordinal scales (i.e., that we cannot confirm H). Indeed, 
the apparently more reasonable (but still unsatisfactory) alternative of assigning a uniform 
distribution to K would have meant that positive evidence does provide some confirmation to H. 
Thus, it is only certainty about an extreme heterogeneity of intervals—to the point of having a 
totally unreliable measuring instrument—that is compatible with the prescription. In that sense, 
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only this certainty about intervals’ heterogeneity is a plausible representation of what it is for a 
researcher to have an ordinal scale. 
Summing up, when modelling the received view on measurement scales from a standard 
Bayesian perspective, the most plausible interpretation of the ordinal versus interval distinction 
maps to the following distinction: researchers have certainty about the extreme heterogeneity of 
intervals versus researchers have certainty about the equality of intervals. How does this result 
bear on our assessment of the received view? Quite negatively—the ordinal/interval distinction is 
not (epistemically) fine-grained at all. The ordinal/interval distinction does not amount to two 
reasonably spaced categories, so that both might jointly capture the situation of most researchers 
working with scales in the ordinal/interval area. Rather, the distinction picks out two extremes of 
a continuum of possibilities regarding beliefs about intervals’ differences. That actual researchers 
will never (or almost never) find themselves between being certain of intervals’ equality versus 
being certain of intervals’ extreme heterogeneity, is, on the face of it, extremely unlikely.  
Bear in mind that any knowledge about plausible differences between intervals (that does not 
entail equality of intervals) is ruled out by the position being challenged. Think, for example, of 
any bounds that physical laws might suggest for plausible relative hardness of minerals, and thus 
for physically possible or likely differences between intervals of hardness scales. That kind of 
knowledge may rule out some levels of (substantial) heterogeneity without, of course, 
necessarily establishing equality of intervals. Thus, such knowledge needs to be assumed as non-
existent if we are to say, as the received view assumes, that researchers have either ordinal or 
interval scales but nothing in between. That the absence of any such knowledge is required from 
the world (of researchers) for the received view to be an adequate framework puts pressure on it.  
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Moreover, focusing on the ordinal scale side of the continuum, it is doubtful that actual 
researchers will find themselves in such a doxastic state (let alone that scales will actually have 
extremely heterogeneous intervals). In order to get the prescription about averages within our 
epistemic representation, radically strong views about intervals’ heterogeneity need to be held by 
researchers. What kind of evidence could they have for rationally settling on such strong beliefs 
is unclear to me. That actual researchers would rationally hold such beliefs in any given actual 
case is, then, unlikely. 6 
Granted, toy examples of ordinal scales can be produced by stipulation. But whether this 
resembles the situation of real-life researchers, working with scales developed out of background 
                                                 
6 An alternative formal representation, which I cannot discuss here due to space constraints, is to use 
imprecise (versus sharp) credences. If the researcher knows nothing about intervals’ differences, she can 
neither rule out any particular value of K nor consider all values as having equal density. This situation 
may be modelled by a set of probability distributions (versus a single distribution), one for each value of 
K∈[0,1]. Under this representation, the ordinal/interval distinction maps to the following distinction: the 
case where researchers cannot rule out any possible degree of interval heterogeneity versus the case 
where they can rule out all possible degrees of heterogeneity (except for no heterogeneity). Under this 
representation, then, we also have that the ordinal/interval distinction picks out two extremes of a 
continuum; in this case a continuum of possibilities regarding degrees of intervals’ heterogeneity that 
researchers may rationally rule out. For the same reasons given above, it is unlikely that actual researchers 
will never find themselves in between these two situations. As before, any knowledge about plausible 
differences between intervals needs to be assumed as non-existent (otherwise some possible degrees 
would be ruled out, falling in between the two extremes). Thus, the ordinal extreme of this continuum is 
also unlikely to be instantiated, because of the radical ignorance it entails. 
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knowledge and experimental work, is a different matter. Indeed, given the kind of beliefs 
researchers must have about intervals’ heterogeneity for a scale to be ordinal, finding a real 
ordinal scale might prove challenging. At least, a strong case can be made that the alleged 
“paradigm example” of an ordinal scale in the physical sciences—Mohs’ scale—is neither 
ordinal nor interval. Friedrich Mohs himself believed he had a sense of how different the 
intervals were. With the exception of the last interval (9-10), he believed that the intervals of his 
scale were not that different so as to render the scale not fit for quantitative analysis. He was later 
on, to considerable extent, proved right on both counts (Tabor 1954; see discussion in Larroulet 
Philippi n.d.).  
5. Conclusions. 
I have cast doubt on the adequacy of the received view as a framework for guiding measurement 
by arguing that it is unlikely that the scales singled out by the received view just are the ones 
which researchers find themselves with in actual practice. When considered from the perspective 
of researchers’ beliefs, the ordinal/interval distinction marks two extremes of a continuum. That 
all (or most) actual scientific scales lie in either extreme of the continuum is not self-evident. 
Indeed, for a scale to be ordinal, quite strong beliefs have to be in place.7 Hence, it is unlikely 
that real-life researchers always have either ordinal or interval scales but never something in 
between. 
Let me clarify that this does not necessarily amount to a critique of RTM. The correct 
interpretation of RTM (e.g., either as a complete theory of measurement or as a more modest 
project) is an open issue. And if RTM is interpreted merely as a (non-exhaustive) library of 
                                                 
7 Or, complete ignorance, under the imprecise credences interpretation. 
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theorems (Heilmann 2015), the above cannot be a critique of RTM per se. Rather, it is a critique 
of what I have called the received view on measurement scales, which includes the claim that the 
actual measurement scales used by researchers may be smoothly classified in ordinal, interval, 
and ratio. 
The thesis here defended raises an important methodological issue. Widespread acceptance of 
the received view has arguably led to the implicit endorsement of the following assumption: if a 
scale ranks correctly but it is not interval, then it is ordinal. This is altogether reasonable when 
there are no other options between ordinal and interval. But of course, we have seen that there 
may be other options available. Indeed, from an inferential perspective, it makes little sense to 
take them as the only two options. Arguably, Mohs’ scale and (at least) several scales deemed 
‘ordinal’ in biomedicine and the social sciences research contexts are merely known to be not-
interval. Being wrongly classified as ordinal is no small problem. Researchers using these scales 
might wrongly be forbidden to make inferences (e.g., from computed averages). Since not-
interval is compatible with being close to being interval (or close enough, depending on how 
strongly positive the evidence is), this prohibition might not be justified across the board. This 
methodological overstepping is, surely, an unwelcome result of the coarse-grainedness of the 
received view. And it may well explain part of the tension between practitioners and 
measurement methodologists mentioned at the beginning. 
Looking forward, we need a subtler epistemic framework for measurement scales. This paper is 
only a first step in that direction. More fine-grained possibilities, and classifications better-
aligned with researchers’ epistemic predicaments, may ground more reasonable prescriptions. 
This would not only be better epistemology. It might also avoid some of the recurrent tensions 
between methodologists and practitioners on the status of their average comparisons.   
This is the author’s accepted manuscript without copyediting, formatting, or final corrections.  
It will be published in its final form in an upcoming issue of PHOS,  
published by The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The Philosophy of Science Association. 
Include the DOI when citing or quoting: https://doi.org/10.1086/714873.  




Hadar, Josef, and William Russell. 1969. “Rules for Ordering Uncertain Prospects.” The 
American Economic Review 59:25-34. 
Heilmann, Conrad. 2015. “A New Interpretation of the Representational Theory of 
Measurement.” Philosophy of Science 82:787-97. 
Howson, Colin, and Allan Franklin. 1994. “Bayesian Conditionalization and Probability 
Kinematics.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45:451-66. 
Larroulet Philippi, Cristian. n.d. “Against Prohibition (Or, When Using Ordinal Scales to 
Compare Groups is OK),” unpublished manuscript.  
Michell, Joel. 1990. An Introduction to the Logic of Psychological Measurement. Hillsdale, 
NJ: Erlbaum.  
Narens, Louis. 1981. “On the scales of measurement.” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 
24:249-275. 
Roberts, Fred. 1985. Measurement Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sherry, David. 2011. “Thermoscopes, thermometers, and the foundations of measurement.” 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42:509–524. 
Stevens, Stanley. 1946. “On the theory of scales of measurement.” Science 103:667-680. 
Suppes, Patrick and Joseph Zinnes. 1963. “Basic measurement theory.” In Handbook of 
mathematical psychology (Vol. 1), ed. R. D. Luce, R. R. Bush, and E. H. Galanter, 1-
76. New York: Wiley. 
Tabor, David. 1954. “Mohs's Hardness Scale—A Physical Interpretation.” Proceedings of 
the Physical Society. Section B 67:249-57. 
This is the author’s accepted manuscript without copyediting, formatting, or final corrections.  
It will be published in its final form in an upcoming issue of PHOS,  
published by The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The Philosophy of Science Association. 
Include the DOI when citing or quoting: https://doi.org/10.1086/714873.  
Copyright 2021 The Philosophy of Science Association.
12 
 
Tal, Eran (2017). “Measurement in Science.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
URL=<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/measurement-science/>. 
This is the author’s accepted manuscript without copyediting, formatting, or final corrections.  
It will be published in its final form in an upcoming issue of PHOS,  
published by The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The Philosophy of Science Association. 
Include the DOI when citing or quoting: https://doi.org/10.1086/714873.  
Copyright 2021 The Philosophy of Science Association.
